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THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 AND THE FUTURE OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
Robert Belton*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court decided a number of civil rights cases1 during
its 1988 Term in which it substantially eroded Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII").2 Title VII broadly prohibits dis-
crimination in employment on the basis of race, color, sex, religion,
or national origin.3 Doctrinal developments under Title VII have
been important for affirmative action as a remediation policy to-ef-
fectuate this nation's professed commitment to equality. Affirmative
action, based on race-specific remedies, is a remediation policy pur-
suant to which race4 is specifically taken into account in the alloca-
tion of jobs and other benefits or opportunities in the public and
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. This article is based on a presentation made by the
author at a symposium on employment discrimination and affirmative action sponsored by the
DePaul Law Review, DePaul University College of Law, on February 6, 1992.
I. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171-75 (1989) (limiting the scope of sec-
tion 1981); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-52 (1989) (establishing standards for
evaluating mixed-motive employment discrimination claims); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642, 650-55 (1989) (substantially undercutting the disparate impact theory of discrimi-
nation the Court enunciated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)); Martin v.
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 766-68 (1989) (broadening the right of white employees and applicants to
challenge affirmative action plans in consent decrees); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490
U.S. 900, 904-13 (1989) (requiring discriminatory intent for allegations of sex discrimination in
seniority systems); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., Ill S. Ct. 1227, 1230-36 (1991)
(holding that Title VII does not have extraterritorial effect); West Virginia Univ. Hosp. v. Casey,
Ill S. Ct. 1138, 1140-48 (1991) (limiting the availability of expert witness fees to prevailing
plaintiffs in civil rights cases); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318-20 (1986) (finding
U.S. government not liable for interest on Title VII judgments). For a more complete discussion
of the cases, see Mark S. Brodin, Reflection on the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The Employ-
ment Discrimination Decisions and the Abandonment of the Second Reconstruction, 31 B.C. L.
REV. 1, 8-9, 16-25 (1989); William P. Murphy, Supreme Court Review, 5 LAB. LAW. 679, 680-81
(1989). See also Leroy D. Clark, The Future Civil Rights Agenda: Speculation on Litigation,
Legislation. and Organization, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 795, 811-15 (1989) (noting the retrenchment
of the Court from support of affirmative action).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
3. See ROBERT BELTON, REMEDIES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1-34 (1992).
4. This article focuses on racial discrimination. Many of the observations and comments, how-
ever, are equally applicable to discrimination on the basis of sex.
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private sectors.5 As I argued in an earlier article,
The affirmative action concept embodies a policy decision that some forms
of race-conscious remedies are necessary to improve the social and economic
status of blacks in our society. That policy decision, however, cannot be iso-
lated from the history that gave rise to the affirmative action concept. When
viewed in light of that history-decades of blatant public and private dis-
crimination against blacks as a group-the underlying premise of affirma-
tive action is manifest: If the chasm between "equality" as an abstract pro-
position and "equality" as a reality is to be bridged, something more is
needed than mere prohibitions of positive acts of discrimination and the sub-
stitution of passive neutrality. That something more, the affirmative action
concept dictates, must include race-conscious remedies. 6
Congress, primarily in response to the Court's 1988 Term em-
ployment discrimination decisions, enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1991 ("1991 Civil Rights Act" or "1991 Act")7 to either overturn
or otherwise modify these decisions. 8 The 1991 Civil Rights Act be-
5. The legality of affirmative action under the Equal Protection Clause also has been the sub-
ject of a great deal of controversy. The Supreme Court in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 507-08 (1989), resolved the issue of whether affirmative action plans, when chal-
lenged under the Equal Protection Clause, are subject to strict scrutiny. The soundness of Croson,
as a matter of constitutional principle, and its effect on the continuing effort of this country to
remedy past, present, and continuing racial discrimination is beyond the scope of this Article. For
a discussion of Croson from this perspective, see T. Alexander Alcinikoff, A Case for Race Con-
sciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1095-1110 (1991); Patricia J. Williams, Metro Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REV. 525, 525-46 (1990) (discuss-
ing the Supreme Court's decision in Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990),
upholding a limited affirmative action plan designed to increase the number of minority owners of
broadcast stations).
6. Robert Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing Theories
of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C. L. REV. 531, 534 (1981).
7. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at scattered sections of U.S.C.).
8. The 1991 Act amends five federal statutes on discrimination in employment: Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988); the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988); the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12213 (1988); the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988);
and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). In addition, the 1991
Act creates three new statutes: Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat.
1071, 1072 creates 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. I1 1991), which provides for compensatory and
punitive damages in employment discrimination cases; Id. § 202, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 creates the
Glass Ceiling Act to study discrimination against minorities and women in high level positions in
businesses; and Id. § 301, 105 Stat. 1071, 1088 creates the Government Employee Rights Act,
which prohibits discrimination against individuals on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin,
and religion for Senate employees, presidential appointees, and some previously exempted state
employees.
The 1991 Act also overturned or modified the other Supreme Court decisions cited supra note
1. One irony in the enactment of the 1991 Act is that President Bush overturned civil rights cases
decided by a Court composed of Reagan appointees who made a difference in the decisions in
these cases. President Reagan appointed Justice O'Connor in 1981, Justice Scalia in 1986, and
Justice Kennedy in 1987.
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came effective on November 21, 1991, upon the signing by Presi-
dent Bush. It culminated a two-year. effort and was the result of a
compromise between Congress and the Bush Administration. 9 The
widely publicized confirmation hearings of Justice Thomas 0 and the
Louisiana gubernatorial election of 1991 in which David Duke was
a candidate" were major and substantial contributing developments
providing the driving force for the Act. Both of these events cen-
tered on, in substantial part, the continuing reality of racism.12 Con-
cern about racism also had been a major stumbling block that had
thwarted earlier legislative efforts to overturn or modify the Court's
1988 Term employment discrimination decisions.'" Thus, a major
issue in the debate about whether legislation should be enacted in
response to the Supreme Court's civil rights decisions was the legal-
ity of affirmative action. President Bush had vetoed the Civil Rights
Act of 1990' on the ground that it was a "quota" bill. 5
Perhaps no aspect of this nation's effort to remedy the past, pre-
sent, and continuing effects of racial injustice in the public and pri-
vate sectors has generated as much controversy as affirmative ac-
9. See 137 CONG. REC. S15,277 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth). For a
discussion of the legislative debate leading to the 1991 Act, see Reginald C. Govan, Framing
Issues and Acquiring Codes: An Overview of the Legislative Sojourn of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1057 (1992).
10. See, e.g., The Sexual Harassment Charges, 137 CONG. REC. S14,564 (daily ed. Oct. 8,
1991) (voting to continue investigation of Anita Hill's allegations of sexual harassment by Clar-
ence Thomas).
fl. See generally Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home. Politics of Resentment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 1991, at A33; Roberto Suro, Ex-Klan Chief Has Even Odds in Governor's Race, NY. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1991, §1, at 1.
12. See Neil A. Lewis, Thomas Opponents Seek To Bring Up Issue of Race, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 1991, at A16; Andrew Rosenthal, Theater of Pain: A Terrible Wrong Has Been Done, But To
Whom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1.
13. See, e.g., John A. Farrell, Bush Endorses Senate's Rights Bill: Democrats See Victory over
Issue of Quotas, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 26, 1991, at 1.
14. The Civil Rights Act of 1990 passed in the Senate by a vote of 65-34 on July 18, 1990, and
in the House of Representatives by a vote of 273-154 on August 3, 1990. President Bush vetoed
the bill on October 23, 1990. VETO-2104, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES RETURNING WITHOUT My APPROVAL S. 2104, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1990, S. Doc.
No. 35, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter VETO MESSAGE]. Senate efforts to override Pres-
ident's Bush's veto failed by one vote, 66-34. Tom Wicker, a New York Times columnist, wrote
that President Bush, in vetoing the 1990 Civil Rights Act, "was dabbl[ing] in white backlash."
Tom Wicker, The Nation: Precedent for a Veto, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1990, at A25. For a discus-
sion of the 1990 Civil Rights Act, see Govan, supra note 9; Leland Ware, The Civil Rights Act of
1990: A Dream Deferred, 10 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. REV. 3 (1991).
15. VETO MESSAGE, supra note 14; see also Holly K. Hacker, Panel Says Bush Policies Foster
Racial Conflicts, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, at A22 (reporting that the Citizen's Commission on
Civil Rights accused President Bush of embracing policies that contribute to racial tensions).
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tion. 1' Much of the debate about affirmative action swirls around
whether the disparate impact theory of discrimination should con-
tinue to be part of our civil rights jurisprudence. 7 The Supreme
Court established the doctrinal foundations for the disparate impact
theory in its 1971 Title VII decision Griggs v. Duke Power Co.i"
The disparate impact theory holds that a facially neutral policy or
practice that disproportionately excludes blacks from jobs and pro-
motions constitutes unlawful discrimination unless justified by busi-
ness necessity." The importance of the disparate impact theory lies
in the fact that it does not require a showing of intentional discrimi-
nation. The disparate impact theory, however, is only one of two
Title VII theories of discrimination. The other theory, disparate
treatment, requires proof of intentional discrimination.2" Of the two
theories, disparate impact legitimates affirmative action." The Su-
preme Court, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,22 one of its
1988 Term decisions, substantially eroded the doctrinal and analyti-
cal underpinnings of the Griggs disparate impact theory. The major
16. Another remediation issue, busing of public school children to effectuate the school desegre-
gation mandate of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), has and continues to
generate a great deal of controversy. Busing during the Nixon administration, like affirmative
action during the Reagan and Bush administrations, became a mobilizing issue for the Republican
party. See CHARLES B. EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE,
RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 88-90 (1991); see also NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE
AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., IT'S NOT THE DISTANCE, "IT'S THE NIGGERS": COMMENTS ON THE
CONTROVERSY OVER SCHOOL BUSING (1972). However, the rhetoric over busing does not seem to
have reached the crescendo that affirmative action has.
17. Compare, e.g., Belton, supra note 6, at 534-98 and Alfred W. Blumrosen, Griggs Was
Correctly Decided-A Response to Gold, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 443, 447-52 (1986) (arguing in sup-
port of the disparate impact theory) with Michael E. Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the The-
ory, Problems and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a
Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429, 489-564 (1985) and William Bradford
Reynolds, Justice Department Policies on Equal Employment and Affirmative Action, 35 N.Y.U.
CONF. LAB. 443, 447 (1983) (arguing that Griggs is not supported by the legislative history of
Title VII and should be rejected). Congress, in the 1991 Civil Rights Act, rejected Gold's position
by codifying the disparate impact theory. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §
105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l) (1988 & Supp. 11 1991)).
18. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The author was one of the attorneys who represented the black plain-
tiffs in Griggs.
19. See id. at 431 (holding that Title VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination, but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business
necessity,").
20. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 314, 335 n.15 (1977) (noting the distinction
between the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories of discrimination); see also BEL-
TON, supra note 3, ch. 2 (1992) (discussing theories of discrimination in employment discrimina-
tion law).
21. Belton, supra note 6, at 588-98.
22. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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force driving the Court's dismantling of Griggs was the conservative
majority's opposition to affirmative action.23
With all of the civil rights laws now on the books,24 statutory as
well as constitutional, one well may ask, why was the 1991 Civil
Rights Act necessary? The 1991 Act provides one answer. In sec-
tion 2, Congress found that additional legislation was necessary in
order to "deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination
in the workplace"; that the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards
Cove "has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil
rights protections"; and that "legislation is necessary to provide ad-
ditional protections against unlawful discrimination in employ-
ment."2 The purpose section of the Act, section 3, states that the
Act is necessary
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and un-
lawful harassment26 in the workplace;
(2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job relatedness"
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs and in the other Supreme Court
decisions prior to Wards Cove;
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the
adjudication of disparate impact suits under title VII . . . ; and
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the
scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection
to victims of discrimination."
President Bush, upon signing the 1991 Act, stated that even with
the Act this nation "would not have done enough to advance the
American dream of equal opportunity for all." '28 He also stated in
his veto message of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 that
23. See Robert Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and the Fu-
ture of Title VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 223, 237-44
(1990).
24. The United States has a host of civil rights laws, orders, and regulations prohibiting dis-
crimination in the public and private sectors on a broad range of criteria, including, for example,
race, sex, religion, and national origin. For a concise summary of federal civil rights laws, see
SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY. 98TH CONG., 2D
SEss.. FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS: A SOURCEBOOK (Comm. Print 1984); see also BELTON,
supra note 3, ch. I.
25. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071.
26. The courts have held that sexual and racial harassment are prohibited under Title VII. See,
e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-69 (1986) (sexual harassment); Harris v.
International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1516-25 (D. Me. 1991) (racial harassment).
27. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (citations
omitted).
28. Statement on Signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1702
(Nov. 21, 1991).
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"[d]iscrimination on the basis of race, national origin, sex, religion,
or disability is worse than wrong[;] [i]t is a fundamental evil that
tears at the fabric of our society."29
The reasons set out in the findings and purposes sections of the
1991 Civil Rights Act and President Bush's 1990 veto message and
signing statements simply mask the real reason that additional civil
rights legislation is necessary. The real reason, I submit, is the past,
present, and continuing effects of racism.30 This nation has pro-
fessed a commitment to a policy of eliminating racism in our soci-
ety. Very few, if any, would doubt the reality of racism in the
United States; its reality is well documented.3 1 The Supreme Court
recognizes the continuing reality of racism in our society. For exam-
ple, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 2 Justice White writing
for the majority observed, and correctly so, that "it is unfortunately
true that race discrimination exists in our country."33 Justice
29. VETO MESSAGE. supra note 14. For an assessment of President Bush's civil rights record
that concludes it consists more of rhetoric than substantive developments, see CITIZENS' COMMIS-
SION ON Civ. RTS., LOST OPPORTUNITIES: THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRA-
TION MID-TERM (Susan M. Liss & William L. Taylor eds., 1991).
30. The term racism evokes strong negative feelings. It has been defined, in operational terms,
to mean the way people actually behave, and it must be viewed as "any attitude, action, or insti-
tutional structure which subordinates a person or group because of his or their color." The "visi-
bility of skin color" is a key component of this definition. ANTHONY DOWNS, UNITED STATES
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS. RACISM IN AMERICA AND How To COMBAT IT 5-6 (1970). An-
other scholar has defined racism as involving three distinct but interrelated acts: discrete acts of
intentional discrimination, acts based on stereotypical notions about blacks, and institutional ra-
cism as reflected in the actual composition of, for example, colleges, corporations, churches, and
other major institutions. ANDREW HACKER. Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE. SEPARATE. Hos-
TILE. UNEQUAL 203 (1992). See generally JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY
(1970) (analyzing the psychological nature of racism). One of the most powerful arguments on
the nature of racism is found in Charles R. Lawrence, 111, The Id, Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 328-55 (1987).
Because the term racism is so emotionally charged, it is interesting to note that the term disad-
vantage is perhaps the present politically correct term to identify racism. See generally Randall L.
Kennedy, The Political Correctness Scare, 37 LoY. L. REv. 231 (1991) (discussing the recent
controversy over "politically correct" thought).
31. See EDSALL & EDSALL. supra note 16, at 88-89; HACKER, supra note 30, at 203; HOWARD
SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS 25-50 (1985);
Cardell K. Jacobson, Resistance to Affirmative Action: Self-Interest or Racism?, 29 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 306, 308-28 (1985); Thomas F. Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds
of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 674-701 (1985).
32. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
33. Id. at 649 n.4. Justice White's observation on the existence of racial discrimination was
made in response to the accusation by Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion, that "[o]ne
wonders whether the majority still believes that racial discrimination-or, more accurately, racial
discrimination against non-whites-is a problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever
was." Id. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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O'Connor, writing for the majority in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 4 an affirmative action case decided in 1989, framed the
issue as requiring the Court to "confront again the tension between
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal treatment to all
citizens, and the use of race-based measures to ameliorate the ef-
fects of past discrimination on the opportunities enjoyed by mem-
bers of minority groups in our society. ' 35 The recent confirmation
hearings of Justice Clarence Thomas36 and the gubernatorial elec-
tion in Louisiana, in which David Duke, a former neo-Nazi and
head of the Klu Klux Klan, 7 was.a candidate are simply the more
recent anecdotal and high profile illustrations of the pervasiveness of
the phenomenon of racism.
If the real reason for the 1991 Civil Rights Act is grounded in a
policy commitment to eliminate racism, then an appropriate ques-
tion is whether the 1991 Act has more potential to help effectuate
that policy objective than similar legislation adopted during the
First and Second Reconstructions.38 My purpose here is to offer a
preliminary assessment on this question as it relates to affirmative
action. First, however, the historical context must be examined.
That historical context, which is briefly reviewed below, requires a
consideration of developments under the First and Second Recon-
structions because the 1991 Civil Rights Act can be described as
ushering in the Third Reconstruction.39
I. THE FIRST AND SECOND RECONSTRUCTIONS
The roots of racism go back to the institution of slavery. Slavery
was constitutionalized when the framers refused to recognize blacks
as full citizens.40 Early developments on the issue of whether blacks
34. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
35. Id. at 476-77. She further noted that "the sorry history of both private and public discrimi-
nation in this country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs." Id. at
499. But see Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992) (arguing that racial
equality is not a realistic goal).
36. See The Thomas Confirmation: Excerpts from Senate Debate on Thomas Nomination,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at A18.
37. See Suro, supra note 11.
38. See infra notes 40-77 and accompanying text (discussing the First and Second
Reconstructions).
39. See Belton, supra note 23, at 244-56 (discussing the need for a Third Reconstruction).
40. The original Constitution did not explicitly mention slavery or race, but the issue of slavery
is dealt with in three provisions: Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3 counted slaves as only three-fifths
of a person for apportionment of membership in the House of Representatives; Article I, Section
9, Clause I forbade Congress to limit importations of slaves; and Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3
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should be recognized as full citizens, with the same set of civil rights
accorded to whites, reached a judicial zenith in the 1857 decision of
the Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford.'" In a profound
statement that undergirds much of the history of racism in this
country, the Court said that slaves have been "regarded as of an
inferior order, and are altogether unfit to associate with the white
race, ... and that they have no rights which the white man was
bound to respect." 42
The term reconstruction, in the civil rights context, is a short-
hand description of the legal, political, and social efforts to eliminate
slavery and the racist legacy of slavery captured in the Dred Scott
philosophy. 43 There have been two reconstruction periods. 4" The
First Reconstruction, which some have dated as occurring between
1863 and 1877, focused on eliminating the institution of slavery. 45
During the First Reconstruction, Congress enacted three amend-
ments to the Constitution: The Thirteenth Amendment abolished
slavery and involuntary servitude;4 6  the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits states from denying any citizen the equal protection of
law;4 7 and the Fifteenth Amendment guarantees the right to vote. 48
Congress also enacted civil rights legislation, the substance of which
parallels in some significant respects similar legislation enacted dur-
ing-the Second Reconstruction..4 1 What happened under the laws en-
provided that fugitive slaves who escaped into another state would be returned to their owners.
Justice Thurgood Marshall has argued that because of the racist origins of the Constitution it was
"defective from the start." Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution's Bicentennial: Commemorating
the Wrong Document, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (1987); see also Raymond T. Diamond, No
Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's Thesis on the Intent of a Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42
VAND. L. REV. 93, 95-98 (1989) (discussing Justice Marshall's criticism of the original
Constitution).
41. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
42. Id. at 407. The Court reviewed more than 100 years of colonial legal treatment of blacks in
reaching its decisiori that blacks had been a subordinate and inferior class who had been subju-
gated by the dominant white race.
43. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-
1877 (1988); MANNING MARABLE. RACE REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUC-
TION IN BLACK AMERICA. 1945-1990 (1991); C. Vann Woodward, From the First Reconstruction
to the Second, HARPER'S, Apr. 1965, at 25.
44. See C. VANN WOODWARD. THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 11-29 (2d rev. ed. 1966).
45. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 43 (discussing the First Reconstruction between 1863-1877).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
47. US. CONST. amend. XIV.
48. U.S. CONST. amepd. XV.
49. See generally Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
MICH. L. REV. 1323 (1952) (explaining the First Reconstruction and the judicial strict construc-
tionism that reduced its effectiveness).
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acted during the First Reconstruction? The history of the disman-
tling of the First Reconstruction has been extensively documented.50
The combination of political compromises51 and Supreme Court de-
cisions, which emasculated the early civil rights legislation, signaled
the demise of the First Reconstruction. Even before Congress com-
pleted its First Reconstruction program, the Supreme Court began
judicially dismantling it. The enunciation of the "separate but
equal" doctrine in 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson,2 and the enactment
of black codes in the southern states, effectively repudiated the First
Reconstruction by legitimating overtly racist treatment of blacks in
education, housing, voting, employment, the administration of jus-
tice, and political and civil rights.5 3 The message of Plessy legiti-
mated a return to the Dred Scott philosophy as was made clear in
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy:
The present decision, it may well be apprehended, will not only stimulate
aggressions, more or less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights of
[black] citizens, but will encourage the belief that it is possible, by means of
state enactments, to defeat the beneficent purposes which the people of the
United States had in view when they adopted the recent amendments of the
Constitution, by one of which the blacks of this country were to be made
citizens of the United States and of the States in which they reside ....
The destinies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly, linked to-
gether, and the interests of both require that the common government of all
shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of
law. What can more certainly arouse race hate, what can more certainly
create and perpetuate a feeling of mistrust between these races, than State
enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the ground that [black] citizens are
50. See, e.g., WOODWARD, supra note 44.
51. The Hayes-Tilden Compromise resolved the presidential election of 1876. Tilden, the Dem-
ocrat, appeared to have won the electoral count by one vote, but the returns from several southern
states were challenged. Blacks had played a significant role in the southern states whose returns
were challenged. The Democrats agreed to declare Republican Hayes president in return for a
promise from the Republicans, who had engineered the First Reconstruction, that the federal
government would withdraw federal troops from the South. The presence of federal troops in the
southern states after the Civil War was for the purpose of aiding in the enforcement of civil rights
that Congress had legislated. After the federal troops were withdrawn, progress in the elimination
of racism under the post-Civil War civil rights legislation rapidly came to a halt. See DERRICK A.
BELL. RACE. RACISM. AND AMERICAN LAW § 1.8 (2d ed. 1980).
52. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy had brought suit for a writ of prohibition against the judge
before whom Plessy had been taken for violation of a Louisiana statute, adopted in 1890, that
provided for separate facilities for black and white passengers on trains. See also CHARLES A.
LOFGREN. THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 3-115 (1987) (discussing
Plessy against the historical-social context in which black racial inferiority was the order of the
day and lower courts were embracing the separate-but-equal doctrine, as a jurisprudential civil
rights principle).
53. See JACK GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 79-114 (1959).
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so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches
occupied by white citizens?
8 4
Even though Justice Harlan correctly perceived the devastating ef-
fects of racism under the "separate but equal" doctrine, his dissent
in Plessy also enunciated the color-blind theory of equality. 5 The
color-blind theory of equality often has been uncritically champi-
oned as the reason that affirmative action is unlawful.5 6
Even though the beginning of the Second Reconstruction has
been dated at different historical points,5 7 the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Brown v. Board of Education5" was indeed a seminal devel-
opment that ushered in the Second Reconstruction. Following
Brown, and particularly during the 1960s, Congress enacted a host
of civil rights laws that again were intended to remedy the problems
of race in our society. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("1964 Act") is
one of the most important pieces of legislation that Congress en-
acted during the Second Reconstruction." The widely publicized
civil rights demonstrations of the 1960s vividly portrayed the brutal-
ity and inhumane reality of racism6 0 and were a major driving force
for the enactment of the 1964 Act.6 ' One of the most important
54. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56. Professor Graglia, for example, is an advocate of this position. See Lino A. Graglia, Racial
Preferences, Quotas, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1117 (1992); Lino A.
Graglia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: From Prohibiting to Requiring Discrimination
in Employment, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. Po.y 68 (1991); Lino A. Graglia, Race-Conscious Reme-
dies, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 83 (1986). For a powerful and well-documented argument that
Justice Harlan's metaphor, "Our Constitution is color-blind," fosters white racial domination, see
Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color Blind," 44 STAN, L. REV, 1 (1991). See
also Patricia A. Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equality, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 2128, 2142 (1989) ("So-called formal equal opportunity has done a lot but misses the
heart of the problem. It put the vampire back in its coffin, but it was no silver stake. The rules
may be color-blind but people are not.").
57. See, e.g., MARABLE, supra note 43, at 3. Marable selects 1945 as the beginning date, which
is the end of World War II. Id. Others have used 1954 as a starting date of the Second Recon-
struction, which is the year in which the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
59. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at scattered sections of U.S.C.). The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains ten titles prohibiting discrimination in areas such as voting
rights, housing, education, and employment. See generally H.R. REP. No. 914. 88TH CONG., 2D
SESS. (1 964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2394-2409 (title by title analysis of the reach
of the 1964 Act).
60. See JUAN WILLIAMS. EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965
(1987); Eyes on the Prize (PBS television broadcast 1987).
61. See generally CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, at 15-28, 232-33 (1985) (discussing the civil
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components of the 1964 Act is Title VII.62 The doctrinal develop-
ments under Title VII have been a major cornerstone of the Second
Reconstruction.6" Griggs v. Duke Power Co.," handed down in
1971, is one of the most important Supreme Court civil rights cases
decided during the Second Reconstruction because it enunciated the
disparate impact theory. The reach of the Griggs disparate impact
theory has not been limited to employment, but has been utilized to
challenge discrimination in other areas such as voting65 and
housing.6"
In a 1976 article that I wrote reviewing the first decade of judi-
cial developments under Title VII, I concluded on an optimistic
note: "Optimism for future progress under fair employment laws
can be expressed only because of the recent judicial and legislative
perception of the causes and consequences of discrimination based
upon .... race."67 That optimism was short lived, because during its
1976 Term, the Supreme Court, in a series of Title VII cases, set in
motion the genesis -for the dismantling of the Second Reconstruc-,
tion.6" Others have suggested that the genesis of the demise of the
Second Reconstruction began at even an earlier69 or later date.7
rights movement and its impact on the passing of the 1964 Act).
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
63. See Robert Belton, Title VI! of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforce-
ment and Judicial Developments, 20 ST. Louis U. L.J. 225, 240-67, 271-76, '279-86, 290-307
(1976) (reviewing the first decade of favorable developments under Title VII).
64. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
65. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory
of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1101 (1991) (noting the failure of black
electoral equality) [hereinafter Triumph of Tokenism]; Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive
Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1423-30 (1991) (same) [hereinafter Guinier,
Elusive Quest].
66. See generally ROBERT G. SCHWEMM. HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION §
10.4(l) (1991) (reviewing the effect of Griggs on discrimination in housing); Mark. W. Zimmer-
man, Note, Opening the Door to Race-Based Real Estate Marketing: South-Suburban Housing
Center v. Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1271 (1992) (analyzing
the legality of affirmative race-based real estate marketing).
67. Belton, supra note 63, at 305.
68. See Harry T. Edwards, The Coming of Age of the Burger Court: Labor Law Decisions of
the Supreme Court During the 1976 Term, 19 B.C. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1977) (noting that the ten
Title VII decisions handed down by the Court "will have lasting, far reaching impact on the
development of Title VIl").
69. See generally Derrick Bell, A Hurdle Too High: Class-Based Roadblocks to Racial
Remediation, 33 BUFF. L. REV. I (1984).
70. See, e.g.. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Equal Employment Law: Crisis in Interpreta-
tion-Survival Against the Odds, 62 TUL. L. REV. 681, 700 (1988) (noting that the danger of the
Rehnquist Court lies in "scraping, trimming, and chipping away" the decisions of the Second
Reconstruction).
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Still others have suggested that the civil rights cases decided during
the Court's 1988 Term brought about the end of the Second
Reconstruction.71
As with the First Reconstruction, both political and judicial
forces were at work bringing about the dismantling of the Second.
President Reagan 72  and his chief spokesperson on civil
rights-Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reyn-
olds 73-spearheaded a campaign to dismantle affirmative action and
the doctrinal underpinning of the Griggs disparate impact theory.
Two cases decided by the Supreme Court, key to its dismantling of
the doctrinal underpinning of affirmative action, were Wards Cove
Packing Co v. Atonio74 and Martin v. Wilks.75 The dismantling in
Wards Cove consisted of establishing a rigorous evidentiary thresh-
old for plaintiffs who sought to make out a prima facie case of dis-
parate impact discrimination. The Court replaced the Griggs busi-
ness necessity defense with a more lenient legitimate-business-
justification defense, ruled that an employer has only the burden of
production of evidence rather than the burden of persuasion on the
more lenient legitimate-business-justification defense, and recog-
nized a cost defense in employment discrimination cases. 76 In Mar-
tin v. Wilks, the Court made it easier for white males to attack
affirmative action plans under the disparate treatment theory.77
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION UNDER TITLE VII PRIOR TO THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
As noted above, the Griggs disparate impact theory provides the
doctrinal foundations for affirmative action. 78 The Griggs disparate
impact theory is premised on the recognition that racism is not only
the result of intentional discrimination, but includes as well facially
71. See, e.g., Brodin, supra note 1, at 29-30.
72. See NORMAN C. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 13-157
(1988) (comparing the civil rights enforcement record of the Reagan administration with all six of
President Reagan's predecessors).
73. See Drew Days, Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights, 19
HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 309, 337-39 (1984); Joel Selig, The Reagan Justice Department and
Civil Rights, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 431, 431-43.
74. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
75. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
76. See Belton, supra note 23, at 240-44 (analyzing Wards Cove).
77. See Samuel Issacharoff, When Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the
Rights of Vested Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 189 (1992).
78. See Belton, supra note 6, at 541-49.
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neutral subjective and objective policies and practices that often are
the result of unconscious racism. Thus, for example, the Court, in
holding that subjective criteria may be challenged under the Griggs
disparate impact theory, noted that the disparate treatment theory,
standing alone, is not capable of ferreting out decisions based on
subconscious stereotypical thinking and prejudice.79
The leading cases on the legality of affirmative action under Title
VII are United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,80 Johnson v.
Transportation Agency,81 and Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' In-
ternational Ass'n v. EEOC.2 In Weber, the employer had a hiring
policy under which it employed as craftworkers only persons who
had prior craft skill. Most blacks who were interested in craft posi-
tions could not meet the prior craft experience requirement because,
historically, they had been excluded from craft jobs on racial
grounds.83  The hiring criterion-prior craft experience-was
facially neutral. In an effort to comply with the mandate of Title
VII (and to avoid a Title VII lawsuit by blacks), 4 the employer and
the union adopted an affirmative action plan. The plan provided for
the selection of craft trainees on an alternating basis under which
fifty percent would be black and fifty percent would be white.
Weber, a white employee, who had not been selected at the time a
black was entitled to be selected under the alternating selection pol-
icy, sued the employer and the union under Title VII. He alleged
that he had been the victim of intentional racial discrimination
under the disparate treatment theory. As described by Justice
Blackmun, the employer was on a "high tightrope without a net be-
neath" him."5 On the one hand, the employer was subject to liability
under the disparate impact theory because, arguably, blacks would
be able to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
disparate impact theory and the employer, arguably, would be una-
ble to justify its prior-craft-experience test under the business neces-
sity doctrine. On the other hand, the employer would be liable for a
79. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988).
80. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
81. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
82. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
83. Weber, 443 U.S. at 198 n.l.
84. Blacks had been successful in a prior Title VII case against the same employer. Id. at 210
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374,
1378 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 968 (1979)).
85. Id. at 209-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Steelworkers v. Weber, 563 F.2d 216, 230
(5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting)).
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Title VII violation in a disparate treatment suit brought by whites if
the employer took race into account in, ironically, establishing a hir-
ing policy that would reduce the possibility of blacks successfully
prevailing in a disparate impact claim. 86
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, upheld the affirma-
tive action plan. Weber established a three-pronged test for deter-
mining whether affirmative action plans can survive a Title VII
challenge. First, the plan must be designed to remedy societal dis-
crimination as reflected in the composition of the employer's
workforce. Second, the plan must not unduly trammel the legitimate
employment opportunities of whites. And third, the plan must be a
temporary or transitional remedial plan that is not designed to
maintain a racial balance in the workforce beyond the need to elimi-
nate the effects of societal discrimination. Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented on the ground that Title
VII provides a remedy only for intentional discrimination under the
disparate treatment theory and that any policy, such as an affirma-
tive action plan, that specifically takes race or sex into account is
unlawful. 88
The Court applied the Weber three-pronged test in upholding an
affirmative action plan that had been adopted by a public employer
in Johnson v. Transportation Agency.8" Johnson, the plaintiff, like
the plaintiff in Weber, was a white male. Johnson brought a Title
VII action challenging the affirmative action plan on the ground
that the employer had taken sex into account in awarding the con-
tested employment opportunity to a female. Johnson and the suc-
cessful female candidate were both deemed to be qualified for the
promotion, but Johnson had scored marginally better than Diane
Joyce, the female, on a qualifying ability test.90 One of the major
differences between Johnson and Weber was that the record in
Johnson did not contain specific evidence that the employer had a
history of discriminating against women.9" Thus, the case posed
86. Id. (Blackmun, J. concurring).
87. Id. at 208 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 219-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. 480 U.S. 616 (1986).
90. The scores of the applicants who had taken a test as part of the selection process ranged
from 70 to 80. Johnson was tied for second on the test with a score of 75, while Joyce ranked third
with a score of 73. Id. at 623-24.
91. Id. at 664 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The most significant proposition of law established by
[the] decision is that racial or sexual discrimination is permitted under Title VIl when it is in-
tended to overcome the effect, not of the employer's own discrimination, but of societal attitudes
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nicely the question of whether consideration of societal discrimina-
tion would justify an affirmative action plan."2 The majority held
that it did.
Justice White, who had joined the majority in Weber, dissented in
Johnson. He dissented on the ground that his understanding of
Weber was premised on the view that Title VII remedies only dispa-
rate treatment or intentional discrimination and that disparate im-
pact discrimination would not support affirmative action." Justice
Scalia, joined by Justices Rehnquist and White, dissented. Justice
Scalia's dissent was based on the same rationale as Justice White's:
Only intentional discrimination is prohibited under Title VII. 4
Weber and Johnson involved the issue of the legality of volunta-
rily adopted affirmative action plans. Local 28, Sheet Metal Work-
ers' International Ass'n v. EEOC95 involved the issue of whether a
federal court could judicially order an affirmative action plan as a
remedy for unlawful discrimination under Title VII. The district
court had imposed a numerical remedy only after finding that the
defendant union was in civil contempt of an earlier imposed non-
affirmative action remedy. A major argument advanced by the
union and joined by the Solicitor General of the United States was
that the trial court exceeded its authority under section 706(g)9" of
Title VII because the remedy was not limited to identifiable victims
of unlawful discrimination. In a six-to-three decision, the Court re-
jected the union's argument. First, the Court held that in most in-
stances a court, upon finding a violation of Title VII, need only or-
der the defendant to cease engaging in discriminatory conduct and
award back pay and other non-affirmative action relief. Second, the
Court held that section 706(g) does not prohibit courts from order-
ing affirmative action relief when necessary to remedy "persistent or
egregious discrimination or where necessary to dissipate the linger-
that have limited the entry of certain races, or of a particular sex, in certain jobs.").
92. Id. at 634 ("It is clear that the decision to hire Joyce was made pursuant to an Agency plan
that directed that sex or race be taken into account for the purpose of remedying underrepresenta-
tion."). The story of Johnson is chronicled in MELVIN I. UROFSKY, A CONFLICT OF RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1991).
93. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 657 (White, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 657-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). Section 706(g) provides district courts with authority to
award appropriate forms of relief upon a finding of a violation of Title Vii. Id. The scope of the
forms of relief a court may award is extensively treated in BELTON, supra note 3.
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ing effects of pervasive discrimination.""7 The Court further rea-
soned that "affirmative race-conscious relief may be the only means
available 'to assure equality of employment opportunities and to
eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fos-
tered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of mi-
nority citizens.' "8 Third, and most important, the Court held that
judicially ordered affirmative action, in appropriate cases, need not
be limited to actual victims of discrimination. 9 Justice Powell con-
curred in a separate opinion,100 and Justice O'Connor concurred in
part and dissented in part. 01 Justices White and Rehnquist, each
joined by Chief Justice Burger, wrote separate dissenting opinions.
The dissenters expressed the view that Title VII provides relief only
for identifiable victims of discrimination, that is, only those blacks
who have been found to be actual victims of unlawful
discrimination.0
Parties to employment discrimination cases often settle before
trial. In a number of cases, particularly those brought under the
disparate impact theory, the parties will enter into consent de-
crees' 0 3 that have an affirmative action component. In Martin v.
Wilks, 0 the Supreme Court considered whether the doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel precludes white employees from collaterally attack-
ing a consent decree that embodies an affirmative action component
by filing a separate lawsuit under the disparate treatment theory. In
an opinion written by the Chief Justice, the Court held that the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel did not bar the subsequent Title VII dis-
parate treatment claim by white employees. The Court further held
that (1) mere knowledge by the white employees of the prior dis-
97. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 445.
98. Id. at 450 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).
99. Id. at 470-75. In United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 165-84 (1987), a case challeng-
ing a judicially imposed affirmative action court order under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court also held that affirmative action remedies need not be limited to actual victims of
discrimination.
100. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 483-88 (Powell, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 489-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. Id. at 499-500 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 500 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
103. A consent decree is an agreement between parties that normally embodies a compromise.
In exchange for the saving of costs and elimination of risk of loss, each party gives up something it
might have won had it proceeded with the litigation. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure requires approval of any settlement of a class action, and a consent decree is a judicial
approval of the settlement by the parties. See Local No. 93, International Ass'n of Firefighters v.
City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 522 (1986).
104. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
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crimination case did not impose an obligation on the white employ-
ees to intervene in the prior suit; (2) voluntary settlement in the
form of a consent decree between one group of employees and their
employer cannot adversely affect the rights of persons who are not
parties to the suit; and (3) the congressional policy favoring settle-
ment of employment discrimination cases does not support a rule
that the white employees should be collaterally estopped from chal-
lenging the affirmative action consent decree in a separate lawsuit.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Black-
mun, dissented. °5
The overarching legal and policy issue in Weber, Johnson, Sheet
Metal Workers, and Wilks was whether racism, as evidenced by
societal discrimination, is an appropriate legal basis on which to le-
gitimate affirmative action plans. "Societal discrimination," the ex-
istence of which has been recognized by the Supreme Court, 106 is a
shorthand description for present and continuing effects of a long
history of overt and subtle discrimination against blacks and
women. 10 7 Societal discrimination is manifest not only in employ-
ment but in housing, 108 voting, 109 and education'10 as well. A major-
ity of the Justices in Weber, Johnson, and Sheet Metal Workers
were willing to recognize societal discrimination as a legitimating
force for affirmative action. The majority recognized that just as the
105. Id. at 769-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. See supra notes 32-35, 87 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979)).
107. See Robert Sedler, The Constitution and the Consequences of the Social History of Ra-
cism, 40 ARK. L. REV. 677, 677-88 (1987). In most instances in which the term societal discrimi-
nation is used, it is never defined with any precision, and the context in which it is used most often
suggests an "ephemeral, abstract kind of conduct, committed by no one in particular, and commit-
ted against no one in particular, a kind of amorphous inconvenience for persons of color." Thomas
Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 313 (1990). Justice Powell
seemed to define "societal discrimination" as any discrimination not practiced by the employer or
other defendant who has adopted an affirmative action plan. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 275 (1986) (noting that in the past, the Court has allowed affirmative action only for
"prior discrimination" by the defendant involved). Justice O'Connor also seems to subscribe to
Justice Powell's definition. Id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (stating that " 'societal
discrimination* ... is discrimination not traceable to a [defendant's] own actions").
108. See SCHWEMM, supra note 66 (providing a detailed discussion of housing discrimination
law).
109. See Guinier, Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 65, at 1080; Guinier, Elusive Quest,
supra note 65, at 1416.
110. See, e.g., Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (desegregation in higher
eduction), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Mabus, Ill S. Ct. 1579 (1991) James S.
Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM L. REV.
1463, 1465-76 (1990) (arguing that desegregation in education is not a "dead" concept).
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law has played a substantial and pivotal role in legitimating a re-
gime of racism,11 ' it must also play a substantial and pivotal role in
remedying racism. The dissenters in these cases, although arguably
willing to recognize the continuing persistence of societal discrimi-
nation, subscribed to a view of color-blindness that blinds them to
the reality of racism. The dissenters were more concerned with pro-
tecting the historically privileged status of the dominant
group-white males. The view of the dissenters is graphically illus-
trated in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Johnson:
[T]he only losers [under affirmative action plans] are the Johnsons of the
country, for whom Title VII has been not merely repealed but actually in-
verted. The irony is these individuals-predominantly unknown, unaffluent,
unorganized-suffer this injustice at the hand of a Court fond of thinking
itself the champion of the politically impotent 112
It does not take a great deal of imagination to correctly conclude
that the group of individuals that Justice Scalia had in mind in his
reference to the "Johnsons" is white males. The conservative major-
ity's decision in Wilks must be viewed as its attempt to preserve
white male hegemony that is reminiscent of the Dred Scott
philosophy.
III. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION UNDER THE 1991 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Congress attempted to undo the damage to the disparate impact
theory wrought in Wards Cove and Wilks in the 1991 Civil Rights
Act. Although as a general proposition, the Act has broad implica-
tions for the continued vitality of affirmative action, this part of the
article identifies several sections that are deemed to have particular
application to affirmative action.
A. Section 105 and Disparate Impact
Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII provides the statutory basis for the
Griggs disparate impact theory.
703(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
111. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896); see also DERRICK A. BELL. RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980) (devel-
oping the thesis on the efficacy of the role of the law in creating, maintaining, and eliminating
racism in American society). But see DERRICK A. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE
QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) (graphically depicting the persistence of racism and the diffi-
culty of the role of the law in dealing effectively with its elimination).
112. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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(2) . . . to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any-way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." '
Congress codified the disparate impact theory in the 1991 Civil
Rights Act. The codification of the disparate impact theory and its
analytical framework are found in two sections. First, section 104114
amends section 701115 'of Title VII by defining demonstrates to
mean the burdens of production and persuasion.' Second, section
105 amends section 703 by adding new section 703(k).
(k)(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under [Title VII] only if-
(i) a [plaintiff] demonstrates that [an employer] uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of
race, color, religion,*sex, or national origin and the [employer] fails
to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the [plaintiff] makes the demonstration described in subpara-
graph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and
the [employer] refuses to adopt such alternative employment
practice.
(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employ-
ment practice causes a disparate impact as described in subpara-
graph (A)(i), the [plaintiff] shall demonstrate that each particular
challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact, except
that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the
elements of [an employer's] decisionmaking process are not capable
of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be ana-
lyzed as one emplgyment practice.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1988). Section 703(a) has two substantive sections. The first
section, 703(a)(I), makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Section 703(a)(I) is the
statutory basis for the disparate treatment theory. The Court did not explicitly state, until eleven
years after Griggs, that the disparate impact theory was grounded in its construction of Section
703(a)(2). In Connecticut v. Teal. 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982), the Court stated that the disparate
impact theory reflects the language of Section 703(a)(2) and Congress' basic objectives in enact-
ing Title VII. The basic objectives, the Court found, are to achieve equality of opportunity and to
remove barriers that historically have operated to favor white employees in the workplace. Id.
114. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 104, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C.'§ 2000e(m)
(1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
116. For a discussion of the burden allocation rules in employment discrimination law, see Rob-
ert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Proce-
dural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1981).
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(ii) If the [employer] demonstrates that a specific employment
practice does not cause the disparate impact, the [employer] shall
not be required to demonstrate that such practice is required by bus-
iness necessity.
(C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall
be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with
respect to the concept of 'alternative employment practice'."'
The most critical part of section 105 of the 1991 Act as it relates
to affirmative action is the business necessity defense. The business
necessity defense has important implications for affirmative action,
and it is primarily for this reason that President Bush claimed that
the 1990 Civil Rights Act was a quota bill. His position was the
same as expressed by the Court in Wards Cove: If the employer's
obligation to rebut a prima facie case of disparate impact is too rig-
orous, employers would more likely adopt affirmative action plans to
make it difficult to establish a prima facie case.118 Although the
1991 Civil Rights Act clearly imposes the burdens of production
and persuasion regarding business necessity on the employer, the de-
bate in Congress and between President Bush and Congress was
whether a rigorous standard of business necessity, which the lower
courts had adopted prior to Wards Cove,1 9 puts employers on a
"high tightrope":' 20 the difficult choice between adopting affirmative
action plans to avoid liability under the disparate impact theory or
risking liability under the disparate impact theory if it does not. 2'
One of the driving forces in Wards Cove was the Court's view that a
rigorous standard of business necessity encourages employers to
adopt affirmative action remediation measures to avoid liability
under the disparate impact theory. 22
117. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)
(1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
118. See VETO MESSAGE, supra note 14, at 2.
119. See. e.g., EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 327-28 (8th Cir. 1986) (practice
must be essential to safety); Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., 745 F.2d 1373, 1384-86 (11th Cir.
1984) (subjective system of promotion held not to meet business necessity standard); Contreras v.
City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275-80 (9th Cir. 1981) (discriminating tests impermissible
unless they are predictive of important elements of work behavior).
120. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209-10 (1979) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring) (citing Steelworkers v. Weber, 563 F.2d 216, 230 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting)).
121. See VETO MESSAGE, supra note 14, at 2.
122. The point was forcefully made in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977
(1988), where the Court noted that the employer faced a Hobson's choice:
If quota and preferential treatment become the only cost-effective means of avoiding
expensive litigation and potentially catastrophic liability, such measures will be widely
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Congress did not resolve the debate over the appropriate standard
for business necessity in the 1991 Act. For example, section 105(b)
provides:
No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol.
137 Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be consid-
ered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in
construing or applying, any provision of this Act that relates to Wards
Cove-Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice. 12 3
The interpretive memorandum to which reference is made pro-
vides that:
The final compromise on S. 1745 agreed to by several Senate sponsors,
including Senators Danforth, Kennedy, and Dole, and the Administration,
states that with respect to Wards Cove-Business necessity/cumulation/al-
ternative practice-the exclusive legislative history is as follows:
The terms "business necessity" and "job relatedness" are intended to re-
flect the concepts enunciated by the Court in Griggs . . . and in other Su-
preme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove ....
When a decision-making process includes particular, functionally inte-
grated practices which are components of the same criterion, standard,
method of administration, or test, such as the height and weight require-
ments designed to measure strength in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321




Section 105(b) was undoubtedly included in the statute itself for the
benefit of members of the Court like Justice Scalia, whose approach
to statutory construction has been described as textualist. 12 5 The
textualist school of statutory interpretation advocates the view that
the only legitimate source for interpretive guidance in statutory
cages is the text of the statute at issue, or related provisions of en-
acted law that shed light on the meaning of the disputed text. 26
Decisions is a key term in the Interpretive Memorandum on the
adopted. The prudent employer will be careful to ensure that its programs are dis-
cussed in euphemistic terms, but will be equally careful to ensure that the quotas are
met.
Id. at 993 (plurality). The Court was unable to garner a majority willing to dismantle Griggs, but
it seems clear that its concern with the Hobson's choice identified in Watson was the driving force
behind its decision in Wards Cove. See Belton, supra note 23, at 237-40 (explaining the decision
in Watson and its significance to Wards Cove).
123. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075.
124. 137 CONG. REC. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).
125. See, e.g., Uncivil Rites, NEw REPUBLiC, Dec. 16, 1991, at 9 (noting that Justice Scalia is
reluctant to enforce Congress' intentions unless there are no ambiguities).
126. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The 'New' New Legal Process,
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991) (discussing the textualist school of legislative interpretation).
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appropriate standard of business necessity because it refers to re-
turning the state of the law to Griggs and other Supreme Court
"decisions." If the term decisions is construed to include Watson,
which was decided before Wards Cove, then an employer would not
necessarily be required to validate 12 7 a challenged employment prac-
tice in order to satisfy its burden of persuasion on business necessity.
If, however, the term decisions is construed to mean only those deci-
sions of the Court in which there is a majority position, then Wat-
son's rejection of the validation requirement must be deemed to
have been overturned by the 1991 Civil Rights Act. The proper in-
terpretation of decisions is not free from doubt, and how the courts
construe the term will have important implications for affirmative
action. The Supreme Court faced a similar issue in Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC. 12 a A major issue that di-
vided the Court in that case was whether Congress, in enacting the
Pregnancy Disability Act, an amendment to Title VII, intended to
overrule both the specific holding and test of sex discrimination
adopted by the Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.129 Gilbert
held that an employee fringe-benefit package that excluded preg-
nancy-related conditions was unlawful sex discrimination under Ti-
tle VII. The sex discrimination test that Gilbert enunciated was
based on a distinction between pregnant and nonpregnant persons.
Based on this test, the Court found no violation because the exclu-
sion of pregnancy-related conditions was between pregnant and non-
pregnant persons, and not between males and females.' 30 Congress
responded to Gilbert by enacting the Pregnancy Disability Act of
1978.'1' The amendment specifically defined sex to include preg-
nancy and pregnancy-related conditions. In Newport News, a major-
ity of the Court held that the amendment overturned both the spe-
cific holding of Gilbert and its test of sex discrimination.' 3 2
127. Validation is a methodology for determining whether a meaningful predictive relationship
exists between an employment criterion, for example a test, and the test taker's ability to perform
a job. See generally P. Jefferson Ballew, Comment, Courts, Psychologists, and the EEOC's Uni-
form Guidelines: An Analysis of Recent Trends Affecting Testing as a Means of Employee Selec-
tion, 36 EMORY L.J. 203, 209-12 (1987) (offering a substantial treatment of the concept of valida-
tion in the context of employment discrimination).
128. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
129. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
130. Id. at 134-35.
131. Pub. L. No. 95-555, § I, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)).
132. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676.
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B. Section 106, Race Norming, and General Ability Testing
The fact that blacks do not perform as well as whites on general
ability tests, including those used in employment, is well docu-
mented.133 The conventional explanation is grounded in the view
that cultural bias explains the difference in performance levels. Sev-
eral strategies have been employed to adjust for the different per-
formance levels of blacks and whites in order to provide confidence
in the evaluation process when standardized testing is used. Two of
these strategies are differential validation and race norming. Differ-
ential validation, which was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,13 " involves establishing different cut-
off or passing scores for blacks and whites. Race norming, or within-
group scoring, measures test performance only against other mem-
bers of the same group. For example, blacks are evaluated in com-
parison to the performance of other blacks, and whites are evaluated
only in comparison to other whites.1 35
Section 106 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act now makes it an unlaw-
ful employment practice for employers "to adjust the scores of, use
different cut off scores for, or otherwise alter the results of, employ-
ment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin. '  This section also prohibits courts from ordering
differential validation or race norming, and overrules Albemarle to
the extent that it approved of that form of relief.1 37 The prohibition
in section 106 was politically motivated. It was included by the con-
gressional Democrats to take away a potential Willie Horton-type
issue from the Republicans in the 1992 presidential election.' 38 Wil-
lie Horton, a convicted black felon, had been furloughed by Gover-
nor Michael Dukakis, the 1988 Democratic presidential candidate.
133. See generally Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in 'General Ability' Testing, 104
HARv. L. REV. 1158 (1991).
134. 422 U.S. 405, 435-36 (1975).
135. See Linda S. Blits & Jan H. Gottfredson, Employment Testing and Job Performance,
PUB. INTEREST. Winter 1990, at 18-20. The Department of Labor first made use of race norming
in 1981 with the use of the General Aptitude Test Battery, and was subject to a great deal of
critical commentary. Kelman, supra note 133, at 1204-22; Timothy Noah, Job Testing Scored on
Racial Curve Stirs Controversy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1991, at BI.
136. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 106, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1)
(1988 & Supp. 111 1991)).
137. See 137 CONG. REC. S15,476 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Interpretive Memorandum of
Sens. Burns, Cochran, Dole, Garn, Groton, Grassley, Hatch, Mack, McDain, McConnell,
Murkowski, Simpson, Seymour, and Thurman).
138. See Govan, supra note 9, at 1077-83.
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While on furlough, Horton had engaged in criminal conduct, includ-
ing the rape of a white female. The Republicans, whose presidential
candidate was George Bush, prominently featured a series of politi-
cally inspired Willie Horton television commercials, speeches, and
leaflets that were clearly racist in an appeal to white voters. 139 Race
became a major factor in the 1988 presidential election. 140
Differential validation and race norming can be considered an in-
tegral part of the affirmative action remediation effort to eliminate
racism in the workplace. With section 106, Congress has now re-
moved an important racial remediation strategy for the elimination
of racism in the workplace.
C. Section 107, Affirmative Action, and Mixed-Motive Cases
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,14 the Court clarified the law on
mixed-motive cases arising under Title VII. A mixed-motive case is
one in which an employer, in making an employment decision, has
relied upon both a legitimate reason and a reason made unlawful
under Title VII. 42 Hopkins held that when a Title VII plaintiff
presents direct evidence that race or sex was a motivating factor in
the adverse employment decision about which the plaintiff seeks re-
lief, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
decision even if it had relied solely on the legitimate reason. Hop-
kins held that the same-decision defense is a liability-determining
rather than a relief-limiting rule. As a liability-determining rule, the
same-decision defense is a doctrine for determining whether the em-
ployer has violated Title VII. Some lower courts had held that the
same-decision defense is a relief-limiting rule. Under some lower
courts' view of same-decision, direct evidence showing that the em-
ployer had been motivated by an unlawful reason would establish a
violation of Title VII, and the same-decision defense would be ap-
plied to determine what relief, if any, should be awarded to proven
victims of employment discrimination.' 43
Section 107 of the 1991 Act reverses Hopkins. Section 107
139. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 16, at 19, 114, 222-24.
140. Id.
141. 490 U.S. 228 (1988).
142. See Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment Discrimina-
tion Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1359, 1364-75
(1990).
143. Id. at 1369-71.
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provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful employment
practice is established when the [plaintiff] demonstrates that race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.
(b) On a claim in which [a plaintiff] proves a violation under [section (a)]
and a [defendant] demonstrates that the [defendant] would have taken the
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the
court-
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as pro-
vided in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to
be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under [this
Section]; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any ad-
mission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment described in
subparagraph (A)."'
An interpretive memorandum-the Dole Memoran-
dum-included in the legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act states that section 107 is equally applicable to cases involving
unlawful "affirmative action plans, quotas, and other prefer-
ences."'' 5 Section 107 has been hailed as the death-knell"" or
"killer provision"' 14 7 for affirmative action.
Reliance on Section 107 to launch a campaign to convert this pro-
vision into a "killer provision" for affirmative action is fraught with
a great deal of difficulty. First, the rhetoric of President Bush in
opposing the 1990 Civil Rights Act on the ground that it was a
"quota bill'''48 must be considered in conjunction with his publicly
announced position at the signing ceremony on November 21, 1991.
In the signing ceremony, President Bush clearly stated that nothing
in the 1991 Civil Rights Act overturns the government's affirmative
action programs.' 9 President Bush's statement on affirmative action
was prompted by the highly publicized and controversial proposed
signing statement prepared by White House Counsel C. Boyden
144. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(1988 & Supp. Il (1991)).
145. 137 CONG. REC. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).
146. See Fred Barnes, Last Laugh, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 16, 1991, at 9 ("The Democrats and
civil rights leaders put [in section 107], even though it appears to outlaw [affirmative action
plans].").
147. Uncivil Rites, supra note 125, at 9.
148. See Farrell, supra note 13, at 1.
149. See Andrew Rosenthal, Reaffirming Commitment, Bush Signs Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1991, at Al, All.
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Gray. Gray's statement proposed that the federal government's af-
firmative action regulations be wiped out contemporaneously with
the President's signing of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.'50 Executive
Order 11,246 requires federal contractors to take corrective action
in the form of affirmative action when an analysis of their employ-
ment practices supports a conclusion that blacks and women are un-
derrepresented in their work forces.151 President Bush moved
quickly at the signing ceremony to distance himself from the
brouhaha generated by Gray's proposed dismantling of the govern-
ment's affirmative action program.
A second hurdle-this one legal-that must be overcome in any
attempt to construe section 107 as a "killer provision" for affirma-
tive action is the issue of whether that section not only overturns
Price Waterhouse but also that part of Johnson v. Transportation
Agency which holds that an affirmative action plan is not an affirm-
ative defense.152 Johnson held that cases brought by white males
challenging voluntarily adopted affirmative action plans "fit[] read-
ily within the analytical framework' of single-motive pretext cases
(disparate treatment).1 53 The single-motive pretext cases rely on cir-
cumstantial evidence, unlike the mixed-motive cases in which there
is direct evidence that the employer's intent to discriminate was a
motivating factor. 54 There is nothing in the legislative history of
section 107 to even remotely suggest that Congress intended to over-
turn any aspect of Johnson, including its analytical framework for
evaluating challenges to affirmative action plans under Title VII. In
addition, as discussed below, sections 116 and 108 are important
provisions that must be reckoned with in any argument advocating
150. See Steven A. Holmes, Bush To Order End of Rules Allowing Race-Based Hiring, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1991, at AI; Rosenthal, supra note 149, at AI.
151. The principal government regulations on affirmative action, 41 C.F.R. § 60-1-999, were
promulgated to enforce Executive Order 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1964-65 Compil.), reprinted in
42 U.S.C. § 2000e note (1988). A history of the Executive Order is found in Contractor's Ass'n v.
Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); see also BELTON,
supra note 3, § 1.16; Russel W. Galloway & Stephen E. Ronfeldt, Enforcing the Affirmative
Action Requirement of Executive Order 11,246, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 481, 481-82 (1974).
152. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (explaining the holding in Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1986)).
153. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973)); see also BELTON, supra note 3, ch. 2 (discussing the five basic analytical models under
the disparate treatment theory).
154. E.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 250-51 (1981) (allega-
tions of gender discrimination based on firing of female employee and retention of male
employees).
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that section 107 is the "killer provision" of affirmative action.
D. Section 116 and Affirmative Action
Section 116 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act provides that "[n]othing
in the amendments made by this title shall be construed to affect
court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation agree-
ments, that are in accordance with the law." 155 This section seems
.clearly to codify decisions such as Sheet Metal Workers in which
the Supreme Court upheld the authority of district courts to impose
court-ordered affirmative action plans in appropriate cases. 156 It also
seems clear that conciliation agreements embodying affirmative ac-
tion components that are part of a consent decree are covered under
section 116 as well, provided the consent decrees meet the require-
ments of section 108.
The category of affirmative action plans that raises problems
about the proper construction of section 116 involves voluntarily
adopted plans such as those at issue in Weber' 57 and Johnson.'58
The legislative history on section 116 offers conflicting views on
whether section 107 is applicable to voluntarily adopted affirmative
action plans. Senator Kennedy, for example, advocated the position
that section 116 is not intended to "change the law regarding what
constitutes lawful affirmative action and what constitutes impermis-
sible reverse discrimination.' 59 Senator Dole advocated the position
that section 116 does not purport to resolve the question of the le-
gality of affirmative action under Title VII, and the 1991 Act should
in no way be seen as expressing approval or disapproval of Weber
and Johnson.'6
A key phrase in section 116 is "in accordance with the law." One
construction of this phrase is the view that Weber and Johnson are
an integral part of the fabric of Title VII jurisprudence. Neither
case was expressly or impliedly overturned under the 1991 Civil
Rights Act. Whether these cases continue to be deemed an integral
part of the fabric of Title VII jurisprudence depends, in substantial
155. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 116, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 &
Supp. II1 1991)).
156. See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Sheet Metal
Workers).
157. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text (discussing Weber).
158. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (discussing Johnson).
159. 137 CONG. REC. S15,235 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).
160. Id. at S15,478 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (Dole Interpretive Memorandum).
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part, on the views of two new justices. Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, who participated in Weber and Johnson, have retired. They
have been replaced by Justices Souter and Thomas. Their votes are
critical to how section 116 will be construed in cases involving vol-
untarily adopted affirmative action plans. Justice Thomas, prior to
his nomination to the Supreme Court, publicly expressed his opposi-
tion to affirmative action-in his writings,"' confirmation hearings
when he was up for a seat on the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals,' 62 and a judicial decision-" 0 3 even though he was a
beneficiary of affirmative action in his admission to the Yale Law
School.'" On the other hand, he has joined Justice Scalia"' in sev-
eral important civil rights decisions in his brief tenure on the
Court.' 66 Justice Souter has not indicated how he is likely to come
out on the issue. In UAW v. Johnson Controls,'67 however, Justice
Souter joined with the majority in holding that a fetal protection
plan that limited the employment opportunities of fertile women did
not survive a Title VII challenge.
E. Section 108
Section 108 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act bars collateral attacks
on affirmative action consent decrees and judicially imposed affirma-
tive action orders, unless certain specific statutory conditions are
satisfied. Section 108 provides:
161. See Clarence Thomas, Civil Rights as a Principle Versus Civil Rights as an Interest, in
ASSESSING THE REAGAN YEARS 395-396 (David Boaz ed., 1988); Clarence Thomas, Affirmative
Action Goals and Timetables, Too Tough? Not Tough Enough!, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV, 402,
403 (1987). He has also criticized Brown v. Board of Education as being based on *dubious social
science and containing a "great flaw." Clarence Thomas, Toward a Plain Reading of the Consti-
tution, 30 How. L.J. 983, 990 (1987).
162. See Confirmation Hearing on Clarence Thomas To Be a Judge on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101 st Cong.,
2d Sess. 58-65 (1990) (referring to a 1987 letter in which Justice Thomas wrote that "affirmative
action programs create a narcotic of dependency").
163. Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
164. See Neil A. Lewis, The Thomas Hearings: Thomas Undergoes Tough Questioning on
Past Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1991, at Al.
165. See Zeppos, supra note 126, at 1604 (noting the statutory interpretive view of Justice
Scalia).
166. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1032-38 (1992) (damages rem-
edy available for an action brought to enforce Title IX); Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995,
998-1002 (1992) (use of excessive force constitutes cruel and unusual punishment even though
prisoner does not suffer serious injury). But see Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct.
820, 827-32 (1992) (finding certain voting procedure changes not subject to federal preclearance).
167. I11 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
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(n)(l)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as pro-
vided in paragraph (2), an employment practice that implements and is
within the scope of a litigated or consent judgment or order that resolves a
claim of employment discrimination under the Constitution or Federal civil
rights laws may not be challenged under the circumstances described in sub-
paragraph (B).
(B) A practice described in subparagraph (A) may not be challenged in a
claim under the Constitution or Federal civil rights law-
(i) by a person, who prior to. the entry of the judgment or order
described in subparagraph (A), had-
(I) actual notice of the proposed judgment or
order sufficient to appraise such person that such judgment or or-
der might adversely affect the interests and legal rights of such
person and that an opportunity was available to present objections
to such judgment or order by a future date certain; and
(11) a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such judg-
ment or order; or
(ii) by a person whose interests were adequately represented by
another person who had previously challenged the judgment or order
on the same legal grounds and with a similar factual situation, un-
less there has been an intervening change in law or fact. 16 8
Section 108 also provides that the 1.991 Act shall not be construed
to alter the standards on intervention under Rule 24 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, or to litigated or consent decrees obtained
through collusion or fraud, or those transparently invalid or entered
by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction.169
Section 108 overrules Martin v. Wilks by rejecting the standards
under which the Supreme Court allowed collateral attacks on con-
sent decrees.1 70 The section also codifies the standards of Sheet
Metal Workers under which a court would be justified in judicially
ordering affirmative action.17 ' The premise of section 108 is that af-
firmative action consent decrees and judicially imposed affirmative
action judgments are statutorily protected when constitutional due
process norms of notice and opportunity to be heard have been
satisfied.
168. Pub. L. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)(I)
(1988 & Supp. 111 1991)).
169. Id. § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)(2)(A), (C) (1988 &
Supp. 111 1991)).
170. See supra text accompanying note 77 (stating the holding in Martin v. Wilks).
171. See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Sheet Metal
Workers v. EEOC).
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IV. CONCLUSION
As Justice Marshall correctly observed in City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.,1 2 this nation's "battle against pernicious racial
discrimination or its effects is nowhere near won." '173 The decisions
of the conservative majority of the Court in cases such as Wards
Cove and Martin v. Wilks "sound[ed] a full-scale retreat" from the
Court's long-standing solicitude to race-conscious remedial efforts
"directed toward deliverance of the century-old promise of equal-
ity,"1 74 and substantially eroded the promise of affirmative action as
a remediation measure for the present and continuing effects of ra-
cism in our society. Unlike Weber, Johnson, and Sheet Metal
Workers, which adopted remediation doctrines that are premised on
the reality of racism, Wards Cove and Martin v. Wilks conveyed a
powerful message that "racism as usual" was to be the order of the
day to preserve white male hegemony.. The "racism as usual" mes-
sage is captured, in substantial part, under the guise of "reverse dis-
crimination." Claims of "reverse discrimination" are those brought
by white males alleging that they are "victims" of discrimination as
a result of affirmative action .1 7  The "reverse discriminationists" ar-
gue that most of the jobs they otherwise would have been entitled to
receive are awarded instead to blacks and women solely because of
race or gender. These claims have been called the "Great White
Myth,'1 76 and rightly so because the reality of racism still perme-
ates the workplace (and other aspects of our society).1 77 Those who
argue against affirmative action generally take a myopic view of the
past and continuing effects of racial injustice and engage in very
172. 488 U.S. 469, 528-61 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 561.
174. Id.
175. See Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052 (1978).
176. Anna Quindlen, Public & Private: The Great White Myth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1992, at
A21.
177. See HACKER, supra note 30 (detailing the role of race in contemporary society in, for
example, employment, housing, schools, administration of justice, and politics). In a 1990 study,
two-person teams consisting of one black and one white job applicant applied for identical jobs.
The results of that study, which attempted to pair equally attractive black and white job appli-
cants, showed that whites faced discrimination 7% of the time, and blacks faced discrimination
20% of the time. Julia Lawlor & Jeffrey Potts, Job Hunt: Blacks Face More Bias, USA TODAY,
May 15, 1991, at A l; see also Ian Ayers, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail
Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 827-48 (1991) (providing a statistical analysis of race
discrimination in retail car sales); White Racial Stereotypes Persist, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1991, at
Al (reporting on the persistence of minority stereotypes amongst whites).
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strident arguments that demonstrate greater hostility to remedies
for racial injustice than to the injustice itself.178 They also take a
myopic view of racial discrimination by rejecting the disparate im-
pact theory, which is premised on the reality of societal discrimina-
tion, preferring instead to narrowly define discrimination as a par-
ticularized act of intentional racial conduct.'79
The 1991 Civil Rights Act restores some of the doctrinal and pol-
icy underpinnings of affirmative action that Wards Cove and Martin
v. Wilks eroded. The future of the continued vitality of affirmation
action, however, is not free from doubt because Congress refused or
was unable to reach a consensus on whether Weber and Johnson are
still good law. Two of the most important provisions on whether we
can go forward in a straight line, during the Third Reconstruction,
to effectuate the policy commitment to eliminating racism will turn
on how the courts construe the business necessity defense and what
is appropriate affirmative action according to "the law."' 80 Whether
Weber and Johnson are "the law" under the 1991 Civil Rights Act
will be most undoubtedly tested by claims based on the statutory
provision dealing with mixed-motive analysis. Will it, in fact, be-
come the "killer provision" for affirmative action?"" I hesitate to
express the same optimism that I did in 1976 about the'efficacy of
Title VII to remedy racism in the workplace' 82 because the config-
uration of the Court has substantially changed since that time. If,
however, the Supreme Court follows its predecessors in dismantling
the Third Reconstruction by continuing to erode the premise of af-
firmative action, we can expect to see the need for a Fourth Recon-
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struction in the future. Also, the Court has rejected the view that
societal discrimination, standing alone, is a sufficient factual predi-
cate upon which to uphold an affirmative action plan on constitu-
tional grounds. Whether the now-conservative Court will adhere to
the view, expressed in cases such as Weber and Johnson, that socie-
tal discrimination is an appropriate rationale for upholding affirma-
tive action plans under Title VII remains to be seen.
A recent study projects that by the year 2000, the majority of
entrants into the work force will be minorities and women, and mi-
norities, including blacks, will be less of a minority than ever
before.18 These projections strongly argue for a more positive vision
rather than a defensive or apologetic argument in favor of affirma-
iive action policies. 184 Corporate America is beginning to recognize
that affirmative action is a good business practice in. view of the
changing demographics of the labor market.18 5 As I have suggested
above, if the real reason for the 1991 Civil Rights is the reality of
racism, as demonstrated in the persistence of societal discrimination,
then courts and policy makers must be willing to face that reality in
construing the Act. If they do not, will we need a Fourth
Reconstruction?
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